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The Cambodian government passed two successive amnesties in the last decade in 
response to the lingering question of how to respond to the legacy of the Khmer Rouge.  
While negotiations aimed at creating a judicial mechanism for holding individuals 
accountable for atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge have lurched forward and 
backward, and while international criminal trials for gross violations of human rights 
have become more common in the last decade, until recently the Cambodian 
government’s primary official response to those responsible for one of the worst acts of 
violence in human history has been the passage of these two amnesties.  The result has 
been a consistent official policy of impunity and amnesia.  
Cambodia is not alone in preferring amnesty in response to a legacy of hatred and 
violence.  Virtually every country that has emerged from a history of widespread 
violations of the fundamental rights of its peoples has preferred amnesty to prosecutions 
and other forms of accountability.  While state preference for amnesty is common, there 
is a large variation among states with respect to the type of amnesty promulgated.  The 
self-amnesty passed by the Chilean military dictator Pinochet in 1978 is fundamentally 
different from the amnesty administered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa from 1996 to 2001.  The Chilean amnesty was a blanket one, promulgated 
by the government to shield its members from any form of accountability.  The South 
African amnesty was much more sophisticated, promulgated by a newly elected and 
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2democratic Parliament for the purpose of providing a minimal level of truth and 
accountability for crimes committed during the apartheid era.  South Africa required full 
disclosure as a condition for amnesty, thus transforming amnesty from a truth-hiding to 
truth-revealing mechanism.  Along the continuum represented by the Chilean and South 
African amnesties, the Cambodian amnesties fall closer to the Chilean end of the 
spectrum; they are designed to entrench impunity and discourage even the most 
minimally-required investigation and accountability.  Thus they discourage, rather than 
further, justice.  
What makes the Cambodian amnesties unjust?  Typically an amnesty has two 
consequences: 1) it prevents the criminal prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, and 
2) it prevents victims from seeking damages, truth, and other forms of accountability 
from those responsible for the violation of their rights.  There is some debate over 
whether international law obliges, or even should oblige, the prosecution and punishment 
of those responsible for gross violations of human rights.  There is general agreement, 
however, that international law requires something more than the typical amnesty 
provides.  At a minimum, justice requires some form of accountability and some form of 
recognition of the harm suffered by victims.  The Cambodian amnesties provide neither.  
Rather than discussing what international law and morality require with respect to 
accountability,2 I will discuss two important choices facing drafters of an amnesty:  1) 
who should be protected by an amnesty; and 2) how long such an amnesty should last.  
The first question concerns amnesty beneficiaries, and is a relatively common one raised 
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3by those who draft and study amnesties.  The second question concerns the temporal 
nature of the amnesty.  It is rarely, if ever, raised by either drafters or observers because 
drafters invariably intend their amnesties to be immediate and permanent.  The 
beneficiary question is directly raised by the content of the Cambodian amnesties; the 
temporal question is raised by the history of accountability and amnesty in Cambodia and 
other transitional societies.  Both have important implications for determining the 
legitimacy of an amnesty.  
The Cambodian Amnesties
In 1994, the Cambodian government passed legislation banning the Khmer Rouge 
and providing amnesty to Khmer Rouge guerrillas who defected to the government 
between July 7, 1994 to January 7, 1995.3  The amnesty provision states:
This law shall allow for an amnesty period of six months after coming into effect 
to permit the people who are members of the political organization or military 
forces of the “democratic Kampuchea Group” [i.e. the Khmer Rouge] to return to 
live under the authority in the Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
without facing punishment for crimes which they have committed.4
The 1994 amnesty does not apply to “leaders” of the Khmer Rouge,5 and appears to give 
some discretion to the King, Norodom Sihanouk, in determining who is granted amnesty 
and whether the individual amnesty grant is a full or partial one.6  In addition to 
providing amnesty for any crimes they may have committed, members of the Khmer 
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4Rouge are subjected to new liabilities under the 1994 legislation based solely on their 
membership in the Khmer Rouge.  
Two years after this first amnesty, on 14 September 1996, the King issued a royal 
decree granting amnesty to the former Deputy Prime Minister of the Khmer Rouge 
government, Ieng Sary.  The two Prime Ministers, Norodom Ranaridh (the King’s son) 
and Hun Sen (who himself was a former official in the Khmer Rouge government) 
requested the Sary amnesty.  The amnesty was granted in return for Sary’s defection from 
the Khmer Rouge, referred to in the decree as “the Democratic Kampuchea Group.”  The 
relevant passage of the royal decree reads as follows:
Amnesty is granted to Mr. Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister responsible 
for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, who was 
sentenced to death and confiscation of all property by order of the People’s 
Revolutionary Court of Phnom Penh dated 19 August 1979 and with regard to 
penalties stipulated by the Law on the Outlawing of the Democratic Kampuchea 
Group which was promulgated by Royal Proclamation no. 01 BM 94 dated 15 
July 1994.7
The amnesty protects Sary from his conviction in absentia for gross violations of human 
rights committed while he was Deputy Prime Minister for foreign affairs from 1975 to 
1979.  The court that convicted Ieng Sary (along with Pol Pot) was created by the newly 
formed Cambodian government that came to power after the Vietnamese invasion of 
1979.8
Although the royal decree speaks of an amnesty, it appears to grant both an 
amnesty and a pardon.  Pardons provide protection from liability after a finding of guilt, 
while amnesties provide protection prior to any such determination.  Assuming that the 
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5reference to the 1979 trial is more than descriptive, the decree pardons Sary for that 
conviction.  In addition, the decree provides Sary with an amnesty for his liability arising 
from membership in the outlawed Democratic Kampuchea Group–liability created by the 
1994 amnesty legislation.  Significantly, the amnesty does not appear to provide any 
protection to Sary for any criminal acts he may have committed or ordered after his 1979 
trial and before his defection from the Khmer Rouge in 1996.  
The 1994 and 1996 Cambodian amnesties are designed to entice defections from, 
and thus weaken, an insurgent army.  Such use of amnesties is relatively common 
historically.  President Lincoln, for example, issued such an amnesty during the US civil 
war in the hope of encouraging defections from the Confederate army.9  The broad use of 
amnesties during an armed conflict is often justified as a necessary condition for bringing 
about peace and preventing additional gross violations of human rights.  That such 
amnesties may facilitate the immediate end of an armed conflict is clear; whether they 
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6contribute to the development and protection of human rights depends on the type of 
amnesty granted.  Some amnesties provide some measure of accountability, and thus 
contribute to the creation of a peaceful and just society.  Other amnesties–in fact the vast 
majority of them–purposefully hinder accountability and entrench a culture of impunity, 
thus leading to a superficially peaceful order precariously built on a foundation of 
injustice.  The Cambodian amnesties are of the latter type.
Choice of Beneficiaries
One of the most important decisions facing an amnesty drafter is the choice of 
beneficiaries.  There exists a continuum of choices, ranging from an amnesty that applies 
to every individual for all time, to an amnesty that applies to one individual for one 
specific event.  The first end of this continuum provides no collective system for holding 
individuals accountable for their acts.  Near this end of the continuum is an amnesty that 
applies to all individuals for all acts committed prior to a certain date.  A number of 
amnesties have taken this approach.10  Moving further along this continuum are 
amnesties that are limited not only temporally but also by beneficiary qualifications.  
Thus, some amnesties protect a class of individuals for any act committed prior to a cut-
off date – for example all members of a military force, or all members of a government, 
or all individuals involved in a particular conflict.11  Some amnesties protect all 
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7individuals for a limited set of acts–thus all those who committed a politically-motivated 
act, or all those who tortured or killed.12  The focus in this Section is on the choice of 
amnesty beneficiaries, and specifically whether there is a difference between granting 
amnesty to political or military leaders, and granting amnesty to followers or “foot-
soldiers.”  In particular, what are the consequences of such a choice on the effectiveness 
and justness of an amnesty?  
International law provides some basis for distinguishing between superiors and 
subordinates in a chain of command.  As a general rule, superiors cannot evade 
responsibility for violations of international law committed by their subordinates, and 
subordinates cannot evade responsibility for their own violations by hiding behind 
superior orders.  In both cases liability is not absolute.  Superiors can be held responsible 
for the wrongful acts of their subordinates,13 echoing the general agency principle of 
respondent superior.  The easy case is when the superior orders a wrongful act; the 
superior is then held liable for the resulting unlawful act caused by the implementation of 
that order.  Further, a superior may be liable for wrongful conduct that he did not order if 
it can be shown that the superior knew or should have known about the wrongful conduct 
and did nothing to prevent it.14  At the same time, subordinates who commit wrongful 
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8acts that cause harm are liable even if the act was committed pursuant to the order of a 
superior so long as it can be shown that the order or act were manifestly illegal.15
Although following orders thus does not provide an absolute defense to liability, it may 
be used to mitigate the subordinate’s punishment.  
Argentina is one of the few countries that passed a general amnesty distinguishing 
between superiors and subordinates.16  The Argentinean “Due Obedience” law 
establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a subordinate who committed a violation 
acted under orders without any ability to resist or to assess the orders’ lawfulness.17  In 
other words, subordinates are not liable for their wrongful acts.  The presumption does 
not apply to the most senior military officials.  The Argentinean amnesty thus focuses on 
the culpability of the most senior leaders and not the followers.18  Similarly, the 1994 
Cambodian amnesty excludes “leaders,” thus nominally making a distinction between 
superiors and subordinates.  (The 1994 amnesty does not, however, define “leader.”) The 
1996 amnesty, on the other hand, singles out one particular superior, Ieng Sary.  
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. 5/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
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9Does it matter whether an amnesty focuses on subordinates or superiors?  To 
answer this question requires reference to two different approaches to the legitimacy of 
amnesties:  a “rights-based” approach and a “social order” approach.  The rights-based 
approach depends on our collective sense of justice and morality.  The social order 
approach, while certainly not unconcerned with justice and morality, depends much more 
than the first on empirical arguments concerning stability and social peace.  The rights-
based approach focuses on the rights of individual victims and asserts that there are 
certain fundamental rights that must be protected by the state, including the right to truth, 
accountability, acknowledgment, participation, and reparations.  The rights-based 
approach focuses on an amnesty’s contribution to the fulfillment of these rights.  The 
social order response focuses on the empirical question of whether an amnesty results in a 
substantial lessening of violence and violations and the creation of a peaceful social 
order.  The social order approach assumes that “peace” is defined relatively thinly as an 
absence of conflict, and not defined more thickly as including an absence of conflict 
based on a minimum requirement of social justice.
Defenders of the rights-based approach argue that states have a primary obligation 
to protect and further the fundamental rights of individuals, and that peace and stability 
will only be achieved if the rights of victims are recognized, vindicated, and protected.  
Defenders of the social order approach argue that too great a focus on the rights of 
victims–in particular on the accountability of perpetrators–will undermine efforts to 
create a stable social order.  Whether truth, accountability, acknowledgment, 
participation, and reparations contribute to genuine social peace presents an empirical 
question, and the anecdotal evidence we have so far is inconclusive.  A similar inquiry 
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asks whether the rule of law and individual accountability more generally contribute to a 
just and stable society–the overwhelming consensus is that they do.  The case of 
amnesties for human rights abuses presents a narrower question: whether creating an 
exception from the normal application of individual accountability when the powerful 
abuse their power is necessary for, compatible with, or detrimental to, a stable and just 
society.  The example most cited to support the assertion that forced amnesia, whether 
through a formal amnesty or an informal system of impunity, provides a stable peace is 
that of post-Franco Spain.  Spain responded to the death of Franco not by engaging in 
inquiries and prosecutions for clear violations that occurred under the dictator; rather, the 
government and the overwhelming majority of the population refused to even 
acknowledge that violations had occurred.  Spain did not descend into civil conflict, but 
instead has developed into a relatively stable and peaceful democracy.  Post-Vichy 
France, post-Civil War United States, and even post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia also 
provide examples of impunity coupled with relative peace and security.  
The rights-based and social order approaches differ in the importance they place 
on deterrence.  The effectiveness of accountability in preventing future violations is an 
important consideration for defenders of the rights-based approach.  Conversely, 
defenders of the social order approach place less faith in the effectiveness of deterrence.  
This analysis of the importance of deterrence to the two approaches is somewhat 
simplified; a full understanding of the role and importance of deterrence must take into 
account the different effects of immunizing subordinates or superiors.  
An amnesty that focuses on subordinates, or foot soldiers, provides a benefit to 
those most immediately responsible for a violation–the torturer for example.  Such an 
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amnesty, if coupled with a truth requirement like the South African amnesty, provides 
detailed forensic information about specific violations:  who did what to whom; how, 
where, and when a victim died; where a victim’s body might be found.  While most 
victims are interested in these sorts of details, they are also interested in why certain 
violations were committed, and why they, or their loved ones, were the targets of such 
acts.  Subordinates can provide some answer to these questions.  At the most basic level, 
they might be able to provide information about why an individual was chosen as a 
target; who chose; and if the subordinate chose, why this particular individual was 
targeted.  They may also be able to point the finger across and up the chain of command, 
and thus increase the number of people who are publicly identified with a particular 
atrocity, and reveal the system of repression–the formal policies and orders–that resulted 
in such violations.
An amnesty limited to subordinates may provide a great deal of specific forensic 
information about a particular atrocity.  However, it will also result in those who were 
most immediately responsible for torture and other atrocities walking free with minimal 
accountability and no punishment.  Such an amnesty offends our collective sense of 
justice and morality embodied in the rights-based approach.  A system of impunity for 
subordinates has two important consequences.  First, it means that the individual torturer 
may mingle among his victims–for example by shopping in the same market–leading to 
the possibility of victims experiencing additional trauma and fear, and tempting them to 
exact personal retribution.  Second, providing amnesty to the torturer undercuts specific 
and general deterrence.  With respect to specific deterrence, immunizing the torturer 
allows an individual who has demonstrated the capacity to inflict the most horrendous 
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pain on another human being to continue to operate freely in society.  Such an individual 
may be prone to other acts of violence and may be susceptible to playing a similarly 
violent role on behalf of another political movement or even for non-political ends.  With 
respect to general deterrence, immunizing a torturer as part of a political compromise 
sends a message that acts of extreme violence will result in accountability only if they are 
not part of a successful political movement, thus creating an incentive for wrongdoers to 
lessen the prospect of punishment by causing the most amount of disruption possible.  
The person who tortures alone will rarely if ever be the subject of amnesty, while the 
torturer who acts on behalf of a political movement that successfully challenges or 
supplants the government may benefit from a negotiated amnesty.  
That said, limiting an amnesty to subordinates may further justice in an important 
way: it may facilitate the prosecution and accountability of superiors and leaders, those 
most responsible for creating the conditions–including the issuance of direct orders–that 
resulted in gross violations of human rights.  An amnesty for subordinates may facilitate 
such accountability in two ways.  First, by pointedly omitting superiors, it focuses public 
attention on responsible individuals left unprotected by the amnesty.  Secondly, such an 
amnesty may result in testimony and other information from subordinates that can be 
used to hold superiors accountable.  With the threat of prosecution removed, subordinates 
will be more willing to come forward and testify.
Holding superiors accountable provides important benefits to a transitional 
society.  Superiors are closely identified with the reign of terror they created or oversaw:  
they are the Pinochets, the Hitlers, the Pol Pots, and those just below them, the 
Contreras’s, the Eichmanns, and the Sarys.  They are thus highly symbolic figures whose 
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prosecution and accountability act as an important proxy for holding their governments 
and associates accountable for their collective acts of wrongdoing.  Moreover, holding 
superiors accountable furthers in an important way special and general deterrence.  
Accountability for superiors furthers special deterrence by decreasing the possibility that 
they and their associates will regain power and oversee a similar reign of terror and 
violations.  Accountability for superiors furthers general deterrence by discouraging 
others with political ambitions from pursuing policies that result in gross violations of 
human rights.  
In addition to furthering these instrumental deterrence-based goals, holding 
superiors and leaders accountable also corresponds to our collective moral sense that 
those most responsible for systematic violations should be held accountable.  Agnes 
Heller famously distinguished between “evil” and “bad” individuals.19  Evil individuals 
are those who promote, order, and create the environment that results in or encourages 
gross violations of human rights.  They are subject to a high level of moral responsibility 
for they are the ones who exercise the most choice.  Bad individuals are those who carry 
out the policies of evil individuals.  They have less, although certainly still some, choice 
with respect to their actions.  They are the ones who agree to commit atrocities because 
they are so ordered, because they are seduced by political ideology, because they want to 
increase their standard of living, because they want to feed their family, because they 
want to avoid harm to their family or themselves.  They are thus appropriately subjected 
to a lower level of moral responsibility than evil individuals.  Holding leaders 
accountable therefore satisfies a basic idea of justice – that of just desert.  That is, those 
19 Agnes Heller, The Natural Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox of Evil, in On Human Rights 149 
(Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). 
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who are most culpable, and who commit the most heinous acts, are most deserving of 
being brought to justice.  
International law reflects this heightened sense of a superior’s responsibility for 
both his own acts and some acts of his subordinates.  The legal doctrine of command 
responsibility in both the military and civilian contexts supports the general idea that 
leaders are more culpable and blameworthy than followers.  We do not hold a 
subordinate responsible for the acts of his superiors. 20  We do, however, hold a superior 
responsible for the acts of subordinates even if the superior did not have actual knowledge 
of the acts of his subordinates if, given all the circumstances, he should have known of 
the abuses.  
There are, however, strong arguments against shielding subordinates from 
accountability if superiors are pursued.  Absent formal immunity, superiors are not 
always the defendant of choice for state prosecutors bringing criminal claims and victims 
bringing private civil claims.  Other issues besides moral culpability affect the decision of 
who to pursue, including the availability of evidence, the obscenity of the wrongful acts 
performed by the immediate violator, and the legal and political resistance an individual 
can mount to deflect efforts to hold him accountable.  Ironically, sensitivity to such 
considerations usually results in an accountability strategy that focuses on subordinates 
and not leaders.  This is because evidence regarding the culpability of the immediate 
perpetrator is more easily discovered than evidence linking someone higher up the chain 
of command.  A torture victim, for example, is more likely to be able to identify her 
20
 Although we do alter our evaluation of the gravity of the crime committed by a subordinate based upon 
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immediate torturer than the individual who ordered or encouraged the violation.  The 
horrendous acts committed by the immediate perpetrator are more likely to stir the 
passions of the public and result in a demand for justice than the more distant, although 
crucial, role of their superiors.  Such sentiments argue for an amnesty that is limited to 
superiors and allows for the use of prosecution and other forms of accountability against 
the individual torturers and killers.  By allowing victims to hold subordinates 
accountable, amnesties limited to superiors satisfy the important goals of justice and 
morality noted above that are frustrated by a subordinate-only amnesty.  By the same 
token, they frustrate the important justice goals that are satisfied by holding superiors 
accountable.  
Providing amnesty to superiors is often justified as necessary to facilitate a 
transition to a more human rights friendly society, and thus necessary to establish a 
peaceful social order.  This is the primary argument of defenders of the social order 
approach to amnesties.  Without a promise of amnesty, those who hold the reins of power 
and terror will not willingly step aside.  Providing amnesty to such superiors thus furthers 
human rights by preventing further violations and creating an opportunity for the creation 
of a more stable, just, and peaceful society.  Not providing such an amnesty, in turn, 
perpetuates injustice and may lead to the creation of more victims.  
The Cambodian amnesties illustrate the distinction between granting amnesty for 
subordinates and superiors.  The 1994 amnesty explicitly excludes “leaders” of the 
Khmer Rouge, thus limiting itself to subordinates.  All of the benefits identified earlier 
with respect to such amnesties are thus available to support the work of the proposed 
tribunal.  Subordinates who were important eye witnesses to both the violations that 
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occurred, as well as to the chain of command that resulted in such violations, should be 
able and willing to provide evidence to the tribunal.  This may facilitate the successful 
prosecution of those high profile leaders most associated with the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge.  
The singling out of Ieng Sary by the 1996 amnesty provides the only possible 
exception to this window of opportunity to hold leaders accountable.  As noted above, 
amnesties to superiors are often cited by defenders of the social order approach as crucial 
to preventing future violations.  The Cambodian government cited such an argument to 
defend the amnesty provided to Ieng Sary, noting that it was necessary to weaken and 
eventually eliminate the military threat and the threat to human rights posed by the 
insurgent Khmer Rouge.  Today, with the benefit of hindsight, it is not clear this 
concession to Ieng Sary was necessary to defend against the threat posed by the Khmer 
Rouge.  On the other hand, the amnesty is limited to one individual, leaving open the 
possibility that other high level officials of the Khmer Rouge might be open to 
prosecution or other forms of accountability.  In addition, the draft of the Statute for the 
Tribunal prohibits the government from granting any amnesty beyond that granted to 
Ieng Sary, and even suggests that the tribunal may curtail the effect of that amnesty.  
The possible erosion of Sary’s amnesty after the dissipation of the threat posed by the 
Khmer Rouge underscores the relationship between the rights based and social order 
approaches to amnesty.  
The decision whether to grant an amnesty to superiors is often a decision between 
providing accountability for existing victims of violations, and preventing further 
violations;  this dilemma is often presented as a choice between peace and justice.  Peace 
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and justice, however, are not unrelated; each is dependent on the other.  Injustice 
undermines peace, and conflict hinders accountability.  Thus, efforts to further the 
development and protection of rights must involve both justice and conflict resolution.  
While these two goals are often held up as antagonists, they are in fact each necessary for 
the other.  In other words, the rights-based and social order approaches are more 
intimately intertwined than many commentators are willing to admit.  How, then, to 
further the goals of both rather than pitting the one against the other?  A brief 
examination of the recent history of amnesty and accountability in transitional societies 
suggests an answer.  This leads to the second issue concerning amnesties: how long 
should such an amnesty last? 
Peace and Justice: The Temporal Reach of Amnesties
Amnesties are not meant to be temporary.  Some amnesties are only available for 
a limited period of time, but once granted they are almost always meant to be 
permanent.21  Recently, however, governments that inherited amnesties clearly meant to 
be permanent have been placed under increasing pressure to restrict and even annul such 
amnesties.  Initially, such challenges were brought within the domestic courts of the 
country that promulgated the amnesty and, until recently, all such challenges have failed.  
By contrast, the few international courts that have addressed amnesties granted for gross 
violations of human rights have all found such amnesties illegal.  Domestic pressure by 
victim’s groups and human rights advocates, along with the advent of Pinochet-style 
21
 In 1980, Iran granted amnesty to those who were imprisoned for certain non-violent crimes conditional 
on them not committing the same or similar crime.  While this amnesty is meant to be permanent, it is one 
of the few that provide conditions for its revocation.  See the message of Imam Khomeyni announcing the 
amnesty, reproduced in BBC, “Khomeyni’s Declaration of a General Amnesty,” March 20, 1980.  Algeria 
passed an amnesty in 1999 that provided both for a general permanent amnesty as well as a probationary 
period of from 3 to 10 years during which an individual’s conduct is monitored, and during which amnesty 
may be revoked.  See Law of Civil Harmony, Law No. 99-08, 13 July 1999 
(www.ub.es/solidaritat/observatori/english/algeria/documents/law.htm).  
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transnational prosecutions that refused to defer to foreign amnesties, emboldened 
domestic courts to question the legitimacy of their own government’s amnesties.22
Argentinean judges, for example, began to challenge that country’s amnesty laws,23
culminating in the formal repeal of those laws by the Argentinean Congress.  Similar 
moves have been made by Chilean judges to hold individuals accountable for gross 
violations of human rights committed during the Pinochet dictatorship.24
At the same time that courts have begun to challenge amnesties both foreign and 
domestic, de facto grants of impunity resulting from the failure to prosecute or otherwise 
address historical crimes have also been under challenge.  The large number of cases 
arising out of human rights violations committed during and in connection with World 
War II–including claims arising from Nazi gold and art seizures, from Italian and German 
insurance policies that were never paid, and from the use of slave labor by the Japanese 
and German governments–illustrates a newfound zeal to pursue violations that have lain 
dormant in the public imagination for decades.  The current efforts to create a tribunal for 
prosecuting crimes of the Khmer Rouge, now more than two decades after those events, 
is a more recent example of a revived determination to address such historical crimes.  
22
 The most famous such example is the Spanish court’s willingness in the late 1990s to entertain a criminal 
prosecution against the Chilean dictator Augusto Ugarte Pinochet despite the amnesty that his government 
granted to itself in 1978.
23 See Human Rights Watch, “Argentina: Supreme Court Should Resist Army Pressure,” available at 
http://hrw.org/press/2003/03/argentina031203.htm.  The report notes that on March 7, 2003, a third judge 
struck down the applicability of the Argentinean amnesty laws to killings that took place during that 
country’s Dirty War.  The first such judgment, issued by Judge Cavallo on March 6, 2001, was upheld by 
the Federal Court of Buenos Aires in November 2001.  That decision is currently pending before the 
Argentinean Supreme Court.  For the original decision, see Resolución del Cavallo at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/juezcavallo03mar.html.  See also Human Rights Watch, 
“Argentina: Commitment on Prosecutions Welcomed,” December 19, 2001, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/arg1218.htm (applauding a government decree “ensuring courts 
consider for prosecution all future cases involving former military and police officers”).
24 The Chilean Supreme Court in July 1999, for example, declared that the country’s 1978 amnesty law did 
not apply to cases of disappearances.  See Gustavo Gonzalez, “Rights-Chile: ‘Caravan of Death’ Trial to 
Proceed Says High Court,” Inter Press Service, July 20, 1999, available at 
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/july99/00_14_001.html.  
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Post-Franco Spain, along with post-Vichy France, post-Civil War United States, 
and post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia are all examples of such delayed accountability.  They 
illustrate a trend in state practice of granting immediate impunity which, after the passage 
of time, gives way to accountability.  Of all of these societies, the United States appears 
to be the most delayed in providing any form of direct accountability for the violation of 
slavery.   While reparations to victims of slavery were attempted shortly after the US 
Civil War, the descendants of US slaves had to wait until a century later for formal legal 
and political recognition of the right to be free of discrimination.  In contrast, France 
waited only a few decades after the end of World War II to begin to identify and hold 
accountable individuals complicit in Nazi atrocities–although such efforts have been 
minimal.  Less than three decades after the fall of Franco, Spain has begun to examine its 
violative past.  Cambodia has been one of the most active of these four examples, 
publicly discussing the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge through debates over 
accountability and through the preservation and public exposure of Khmer Rouge 
atrocities through such institutions as the Genocide Museum at Tuol Sleng.  Of course, in 
all four cases the amount of accountability has been minimal, and the social cost of 
waiting decades to begin to identify and hold individuals accountable is undoubtedly 
significant, although difficult to quantify.  
These examples illustrate how the passage of time may increase the political will 
to hold individuals accountable for past atrocities.  This should not come as a surprise, for 
the passage of time has always affected our sense of what justice requires.  The most 
common manifestation of this phenomenon is statutes of limitation.25  Immunities also 
25
 There are others as well, including the equitable doctrine of laches.  Most of the observations I make 
concerning statutes of limitations also apply to other similar legal mechanisms.  
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illustrate the relationship between the passage of time and accountability.  The effect of 
statutes of limitation is the opposite of amnesties in that limitations periods initially allow 
claims to be brought and then bar such claims after the passage of the statutory amount of 
time.  Immunities are more like amnesties in that they bar claims immediately upon the 
occurrence of a wrongful act.  The policies underlying statutes of limitation, and head of 
state and diplomatic immunities, and current trends in the law with respect to all three, 
also provide insights into the contemporary treatment and legitimacy of amnesties.    
Statutes of limitation establish the temporal point at which the pursuit of 
accountability risks injustice.  Claims for wrongs committed in the distant past are 
viewed with trepidation for two major reasons:  (1) they present high evidentiary barriers, 
and (2) they disrupt reasonable expectations of social stability and certainty.  The ability 
to establish and corroborate evidence becomes more difficult with the passage of time –
witnesses die, move, or become less sure in their recollections, and documents deteriorate 
or disappear.  Statutes of limitation are thus designed to make sure that matters are raised 
and adjudicated before the onset of such evidentiary concerns.  In addition, statutes of 
limitation protect reasonable expectations of stability and certainty by requiring that 
defendants be given timely notice of any claim against them.  By establishing a time after 
which a claim may not be brought, statutes of limitations provide closure and certainty 
with respect to liability.26  In fact, this latter justification, concerning notice to potential 
defendants, is probably stronger than the evidentiary concern, since legal systems 
26 See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342, 348-9 (1944)
(“Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to 
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even 
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation 
and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”).
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regularly tolerate the passage of a fair amount of time between the filing of a complaint 
and the testing of evidence through the evidentiary rigors of a trial.  
Concerns raised by stale evidence and the desire for closure are given less weight 
in cases involving the most extreme violations, or in cases where the delay in bringing a 
claim is caused by forces outside of the control of the claimant.  Thus the more serious a 
violation, the longer the period of limitation.  The crime of murder, for example, is not 
subject to any period of limitations in most US states.27  Under international law, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to any period of limitations.28  The 
limitations period may be equitably tolled if, for example, the defendant fraudulently 
conceals the existence of a cause of action; the plaintiff is subject to a legal disability, 
such as infancy, insanity, or imprisonment; or the plaintiff is prevented from filing suit by 
force of law.29
The policies underlying an extended statute of limitation for the most serious 
crimes, and tolling in cases of fraud and other circumstances, provide a serious challenge 
to amnesties.  While amnesties are like statutes of limitation in that they create a barrier 
to accountability, they are unlike statutes of limitation in that they usually provide no
opportunity for such accountability.  Amnesties usually apply to the most serious 
27 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06, cmt 2(a) (noting that murder, treason, and other crimes of comparable 
magnitude often have no limitation period).  
28 See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, opened for signature Jan. 24, 1974,  Europ. T.S. 
No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540.  For an example of the application of this principle in practice, see 
Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistant et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, Cass. Crim 
[Criminal Chamber], Dec. 20, 1985, translated in  78 I.L.R. 125 (French prosecution brought against 
individual for Nazi-era atrocities decades after the commission of the underlying acts).
29
 “Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations,” 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1220-1237 (1950) 
(discussing postponement and suspension of statutes of limitation).  Suspension of statutes of limitation 
when plaintiffs have been prevented from filing suit by force of law does not appear to refer to amnesties, 
but to statutes and injunctions that temporarily protect a defendant from being sued.  The authors of this 
comprehensive survey cite as an example an Alabama statute that prohibits suit against a personal 
representative for a specified period after qualification.  Id. at 1233 n. 466.
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offences–those for which there is a long or no limitations period–and in fact create the 
sort of barrier to accountability that justifies extending, through tolling, the period during 
which a claim may be brought.  
More like amnesties than statutes of limitations–and thus presenting a less serious 
challenge to an amnesty’s legitimacy–are diplomatic and head of state immunities.  Like 
amnesties, they bar claims for accountability immediately following a violation.  Like 
some amnesties in practice, after a period of time such immunities fall away and open the 
door to accountability.  Unlike amnesties, however, the life of immunities is not tied to 
the mere passage of time, but to the changing of the official status of the individual.  
Immunities generally attach to an office, and only derivatively to the individual who 
holds that office; the immunity usually does not remain with the individual after she 
leaves her official position.  Despite these differences, immunities do share an important 
similarity with the emerging trend of amnesties in practice: they usually delay, rather than 
prohibit, accountability.  
Defenders of head of state immunity justify it as protecting the nature and dignity 
of the office, comity, mutual respect among nations, and the stability of international 
relations and diplomacy.30  Similarly, defenders of the more general practice of granting 
diplomatic immunity to state officials cite to the importance of preserving relations 
among states, and facilitating the official actions of state representatives. 31
The ICJ recently issued a decision reaffirming the importance of diplomatic 
immunity because of the crucial functions performed by, in that case, a Minister of 
30 See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (EDNY 1994) (mentioning all of these justifications). 
31 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium) ¶ 53-5, 41 ILM 536, 549-50 (2002) (affirming the functional arguments in favor of official 
immunities under international law).  
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Foreign Affairs.32  The court’s opinion was careful to note, however, that it was only 
pronouncing on the validity of diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction asserted 
by a national court.  The court specifically noted that its reasoning did not apply to 
assertions of jurisdiction by an international tribunal, and also that it did not apply to a 
former state official.  
In fact prior to the ICJ decision, the ICTY reflected the modern trend concerning 
such immunities and approved the first international indictment against a sitting head of 
state, Solobodan Milosovic.  The ICJ decision does not challenge that indictment, 
specifically noting that its reasoning does not apply to assertions of jurisdiction by an 
international criminal court.  Assertions of accountability against sitting heads of state are 
limited and controversial.  Assertions of jurisdiction against former heads of state and 
officials, however, are much more widely accepted.  While this may mean that claims 
may not be allowed until many years, if not decades, after the underlying event, the 
policies that justify extending and tolling limitations periods can also be used to justify 
the delayed assertion of claims against a state official.  
Statutes of limitations and immunities, therefore, allow accountability long after 
the occurrence of the underlying crime.  The evolving practice of amnesties, whereby 
immunity attaches immediately and then is later lifted, is similar to the more formal 
practice of diplomatic immunity and tolling of limitations.33  In both cases accountability 
is delayed, but not foreclosed.  
32 Id.
33
 A potentially significant difference between amnesties, on the one hand, and limitations and immunities 
on the other concerns the initial expectations of both.  Recipients of amnesties assume that the amnesty is 
permanent, and may have acted accordingly by, for example, giving up power.  The jurisdiction concerning 
immunities and the tolling of limitations make it less reasonable for a recipient to claim unfulfilled 
expectations upon the later assertion of accountability.  A similar argument can probably be made for 
amnesties, especially those that apply to gross violations of human rights.  
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Accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge follows this evolving practice 
of amnesties.  With the exception of the Vietnamese-sponsored trial in absentia in 1979, 
there has been no mechanism for holding members of the Khmer Rouge accountable for 
their violations.  It is only now, close to three decades after the event, that there is a 
serious effort to provide accountability.  
This evolving practice of states with respect to amnesties suggests the creation of 
a limited amnesty that may continue to be attractive to its beneficiaries while at the same 
time providing some possibility of accountability.  State practice with respect to 
amnesties approximates something like a reverse statute of limitations:  a period of time 
during which accountability is initially barred, and then lifted after some period of time 
so that some form of accountability–sometimes as much as a criminal trial–can take 
place.  This practice could be incorporated into a formal rule of international law that 
would allow the granting of an amnesty that would initially last for only five or ten years.  
At the end of that period, an evaluation could be made to determine if the beneficiary of 
the amnesty is entitled to a permanent amnesty or something less.  Such a determination 
could be based upon the actions of the beneficiary during the “probationary” limited 
amnesty period.  This would create an incentive for beneficiaries (1) to show through 
their words and deeds that they no longer pose a threat to society; (2) to provide personal 
reparations not only to their immediate victims but to the larger society; and (3) to model 
human rights positive behavior to similarly situated individuals who might otherwise 
commit or sponsor gross violations of human rights.  It is important that the life span of 
the initial amnesty be at least five years, both to provide a sweet enough “carrot” to 
induce the recipient to give up power, as well as to provide enough time for the 
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beneficiary to demonstrate more than a superficial commitment to human rights and the 
rule of law.  A permanent amnesty at the end of the probationary period might be rare, 
and could be conditioned on further demonstrations of support, such as participating in a 
truth commission, testifying at the trial of others, or otherwise assisting in investigations.  
If a permanent amnesty is not granted, the actions during the probationary period that 
were found not to be sufficient could be used in mitigation during any subsequent 
criminal or civil action.  
The two Cambodian amnesties are now nine and seven years old.  They were both 
justified as necessary to entice defections from the exiled Khmer Rouge.  That function is 
no longer necessary today, and the emerging trend of the law of amnesties suggests that 
such amnesties should be weakened, if not reversed, by the tribunal.  The drafters of the 
tribunal statute clearly have such a situation in mind.  The statute explicitly prohibits the 
Cambodian government from granting, in the future, any amnesty or pardon to “any 
persons who may be investigated for or convicted of crimes” covered by the tribunal.”34
With respect to amnesties and pardons already granted by the Cambodian government, 
the statute makes specific reference to the 1996 pardon and amnesty to Ieng Sary.  The 
drafters do not go so far as to reverse Sary’s protection, instead delegating to the tribunal 
the power to review and determine the scope of that amnesty.35
There is no reference in the statute to the 1994 amnesty.  As noted above the 1994 
amnesty was limited to subordinates.  The effect of this is that the more publicly 
identified leaders responsible for the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge are open to 
prosecution – potentially including Ieng Sary – while the more numerous subordinates 
34
 Statute, Art. 11(1).  
35 Id., Art. 11(2).  
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will continue to be free to circulate among their former victims with impunity.  So long 
as the tribunal is empowered to revisit the 1996 amnesty, there is no reason to preclude a 
similar examination of the 1994 amnesty.  Empowering the tribunal to review the 1994 
amnesty would provide an opportunity for the tribunal to use its discretion in granting the 
“carrot” of preserving an individual’s immunity to entice that subordinate to provide 
evidence concerning atrocities and those who ordered them.  This would preserve the 
benefits resulting from an amnesty limited to subordinates, while at the same time 
extracting some accountability–through testimony and the provision of other evidence–
from those individuals who performed most of the actual tortures and killings.  
Conclusion
The answer to the “who” and “how long” questions influence the legitimacy of an 
amnesty but are not in themselves decisive of that question.  While some argue that all 
amnesties by their nature are illegitimate, I have argued that some types of amnesties can 
qualify as legitimate.  Amnesties can be divided into three broad categories: amnesic, 
compromise, and accountable.36  The Cambodian amnesties are amnesic.  Their primary 
purpose is to conceal and forget, rather than reveal and account.  They provide no 
accountability, no benefits to victims, and no revelations concerning the violations of the 
amnesty’s beneficiaries.  They are thus illegitimate.   
36
 An amnesty is “accountable” if it imposes some form of accountability on wrongdoers and provides 
some relief or reparations to victims.  The 1995 South African amnesty is the only amnesty that currently 
qualifies as an accountable amnesty.  Compromise amnesties fall between accountable and amnesic 
amnesties, and partially reveal and partially conceal.  Amnesties passed in Guatemala and Honduras are 
good examples of compromise amnesties.  For the Honduran amnesty see Vladimir Recinos, Honduran 
Supreme Court Rules Against Military Officers’ Petition, F.B.I.S. LAT 96-015 (Jan. 23, 1996); Honduras, 
Corte Suprema de Justicia, Recurso de Amparo en Revision, No. 60-96, case Hernandez Santos y otros 
(Tegucigalpa Jan. 18, 1996).  For the Guatemalan amnesty see Margaret Popkin, Guatemala’s National 
Reconciliation Law: Combating Impunity or Continuing it?, 24 Revista IIDH173 (1996).  I have discussed 
in more detail these three categories of amnesties in Ronald C. Slye, “The Legitimacy of Amnesties under 
International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?” 43 
Virg. J. Int’l L.173 (2002).  There is a fourth category, corrective amnesties, that is not applicable to this 
discussion.  
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The substantive differences between the two Cambodian amnesties illustrate the 
important issues underlying choice of beneficiaries.  Their implementation in light of the 
recent agreement to create a criminal tribunal to try members of the Khmer Rouge 
illustrates the contemporary ambiguity with respect to amnesties for such serious crimes 
and the contemporary pressure to limit the reach and strength of such amnesties.  The 
recent agreement to create a tribunal to hold members of the Khmer Rouge accountable is 
a welcome development.  It would be a shame to mar such a development by recognizing 
and giving legitimacy to the illegitimate Cambodian amnesties.  
The current draft agreement between the UN and the Cambodian Government for 
the creation of a tribunal, which is still awaiting formal approval by the Cambodian 
Parliament, does not take a very strong stand against the recognition of amnesties.  It 
forbids the future granting of amnesties by the Cambodian government to persons 
suspected of abuses during the Khmer Rouge period, but does not forbid the recognition 
of amnesties granted prior to the coming into force of the tribunal agreement.37  As noted, 
the agreement makes a specific reference to the 1996 amnesty granted to Ieng Sary, but 
instead of clarifying its legitimacy, it leaves to the tribunal judges the decision of whether 
to review and limit Sary’s amnesty.38 While disappointing, this decision to defer to the 
judges opens the possibility that Sary could in effect be the recipient of a limited amnesty 
as described above.  Sary has already enjoyed seven years of formal immunity from 
prosecution.  If he were to be tried and convicted by the tribunal, his sentence could be 
mitigated if he has demonstrated adequate remorse and rehabilitation through acts of 
reconciliation and personal reparation.  The current draft agreement would not preclude 
37
 Draft Agreeement, Article 11(1). 
38
 Draft Agreement, Article 11(2).  
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the judges from making such a decision.  As recommended above, the tribunal should 
also be given the same power with respect to the 1994 amnesty.  This would allow the 
tribunal to put pressure on subordinates to testify in return for continued immunity, and 
thus increase our knowledge of atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge period and 
provide crucial evidence that can be used to prosecute those most responsible for such 
atrocities.  If they are given the chance, and have the courage to do so, the tribunal judges 
might piece together a limited amnesty that contributes to both truth and justice, and thus 
make an important contribution to the creation of a rule of international law that 
recognizes the important political realities facing transitional societies without ignoring 
the importance of accountability for gross violations of human rights.  
